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Abstract. In machine learning, classifiers are used to predict a class of
a given query based on an existing (already classified) database. Given a
database S of n d-dimensional points and a d-dimensional query q, the
k-nearest neighbors (kNN) classifier assigns q with the majority class of
its k nearest neighbors in S.
In the secure version of kNN, S and q are owned by two different parties
that do not want to share their (sensitive) data. A secure classifier has
many applications. For example, diagnosing a tumor as malignant or
benign. Unfortunately, all known solutions for secure kNN either require a
large communication complexity between the parties, or are very inefficient
to run (estimated running time of weeks).
In this work we present a classifier based on kNN, that can be implemented
efficiently with homomorphic encryption (HE). The efficiency of our
classifier comes from a relaxation we make on kNN, where we allow it
to consider κ nearest neighbors for κ ≈ k with some probability. We
therefore call our classifier k-ish Nearest Neighbors (k-ish NN).
The success probability of our solution depends on the distribution of the
distances from q to S and increase as its statistical distance to Gaussian
decrease.
To efficiently implement our classifier we introduce the concept of doubly-
blinded coin-toss. In a doubly-blinded coin-toss the success probability
as well as the output of the toss are encrypted. We use this coin-toss to
efficiently approximate the average and variance of the distances from q
to S. We believe these two techniques may be of independent interest.
When implemented with HE, the k-ish NN has a circuit depth (or poly-
nomial degree) that is independent of n, therefore making it scalable.
We also implemented our classifier in an open source library based on
HELib [13] and tested it on a breast tumor database. The accuracy of our
classifier (measured as F1 score) were 98% and classification took less than
3 hours compared to (estimated) weeks in current HE implementations.
1 Introduction
A key task in machine learning is to classify an object based on a database of
previously classified objects. For example, with a database of tumors, each of them
classified as malignant or benign, we wish to classify a new tumor. Classification
algorithms have been long studied. For example, k nearest neighbor (kNN)
classifier [8], where a classification of a new tumor is done by considering the k
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nearest neighbors (i.e. the most similar tumors, for some notion of similarity).
The decision is then taken to be the majority class of those neighbors.
In some cases, we wish to perform the classification without sharing the
database or the query. In our example, the database may be owned by a hospital
while the query is done by a clinic. Here, sharing the database is prohibited by
regulations (e.g. HIPPA [4]) and sharing the query may expose the hospital and
the clinic to liabilities and regulations (e.g. HIPAA [4] and GDPR [11]).
In secure multi-party computation (MPC), several parties compute a function
without sharing their input. Solutions such as [2,24] have the disadvantage of
having a large communication complexity. Specifically it is proportional to the
running time of the computation. Recently, secure-MPC have been proposed based
on homomorphic encryption (HE) (see [3]) that makes it possible to compute a
polynomial over encrypted messages (ciphertexts). Using HE, the communication
complexity becomes proportional to the size of the input and output. In our
example, the clinic encrypts its query with HE and sends the encrypted query
to the hospital. The polynomial the hospital applies is evaluated to output a
ciphertext that can be decrypted, (only) by the clinic, to get the classification of
the query. See Figure 1.
Server
securely compare 
Client
neighbors s1, . . . , sn
JqK, pk
Encrypt
count countJC1K
q
JC0K, JC1K
Find k nearest
JclassqKDecryptclassq
JC0K
Fig. 1. A HE-based protocol for Secure k-nearest neighbors classifier. (i) A client has a
pair (sk, pk) and a query q. The client encrypts the query JqK = Encpk(q) and sendsJqK and pk to the server. (ii) The Server securely finds the k neighbors of JqK from
s1, . . . , sn. (iii) The Server securely counts JC0K and JC1K, the number of neighbors
having class 0 and 1, respectively. Since these are counted with HE the result, JC0K andJC1K, are also encrypted. (iv) The server computes a polynomial over JC0K and JC1K
that determines JclassqK, the class of q. (iv) The server sends the ciphertext JclassqK to
the client. (v) The client decrypts classq = Decsk(JclassqK).
The downside of using HE is the efficiency of evaluating polynomials. Although
generic recipes exists that formulate any algorithm as a polynomial of its input, in
practice the polynomials generated by these recipes have poor performance. The
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main reason for the poor performance is the lack of any comparison operators.
Since comparisons leak information that can be used to break the encryption,
under HE we can only have a “comparison” polynomial whose output is encrypted
and equals 1 if the comparison holds and 0 otherwise. The second reason is
an artifact of homomorphic encryption schemes: the overhead of evaluating a
single operation grows with the degree of the evaluated polynomial. For many
“interesting” problems it is a challenge to construct a polynomial that can be
efficiently evaluated with HE.
In this paper we consider the secure classification problem. We propose
a new classifier which we call k-ish nearest neighbors. In this new classifier
the server considers some κ ≈ k nearest neighbors to the query. Relaxing the
number of neighbors significantly improves the time performance of our classifier
while having a small impact on the accuracy performance. Specifically, the time
to compute our classifier on real breast cancer database dropped from weeks
(estimated) to less than 3 hours, while the accuracy (measured by F1 score)
decreased from 99% to 98%. See details in Section 9.
The solution we introduce in this paper assumes the distances of the database
to the query are statistically close to Gaussian distribution. Although sounding
too limiting, we argue (and show empirically) otherwise. We show that many
times the distribution of distances is statistically close enough to Gaussian. In
future work, we intend to remove this assumption.
The efficiency of our solution comes from two new non-deterministic primitives
that we introduce in this paper:
– a new approach to efficiently compute an approximation to 1/m
∑n
i=1 f(JxiK),
where n,m are integers, f is an increasing invertible function and Jx1K, Jx2K, . . .
are ciphertexts.
– a doubly-blinded coin-tossing algorithm, where the result and the probability
of the toss are encrypted.
We believe these two primitives are of independent interest and can be used in
other algorithm as well
We built a system written in C++ and using HElib [13] to securely classify
breast tumor as benign or malignant using k-ish NN classifier. Our classifier
used the Wisconsin Diagnostic Breast Cancer Data Set [9], classified a query in
less than 3 hours with 98% accuracy. This significantly improves over previous
running times and makes secure classifications with HE a solution that is practical
enough to be implemented.
2 Related Work
Previous work on secure kNN either had infeasible running time or had a large
communication complexity. For example, in [22], Wong et al. considered a distance
recoverable encryption to have the server encrypt S. The user encrypts q and
a management system computes and compares the distances. However, this
scheme leaks information to an attacker knowing some of the points in S [23],
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in addition some data leaks to the management system. In [7], Cheng et al.
proposed a similar faster scheme where their speedup was achieved by using
a secure index. Their scheme relies upon a cloud server that does not collude
with the data owner, a model which is not always possible or trusted. In [25],
Yiu et at. considered the two dimensional case where users want to hide their
locations. They use a cryptographic transformation scheme to let the user perform
a search on an R-tree, which requires as many protocol rounds as the height of
the tree. In addition, most of their computation is done in by the user which
might not always be feasible. In [15], Hu et al. propose a scheme to traverse an
R-tree where a homomorphic encryption scheme is used to compute distances
and choose the next node in the traversing of the R-tree. However, this scheme
is vulnerable if the attacker knows some of the points in S [23]. In addition, the
communication complexity is proportional to the height of the R-tree. In [26],
Zhu et al. considered a security model in which users are untrusted. In their
scheme the Server communicates with the cloud to compute the set of k nearest
neighbors to the query q, however, this leaks some information on q. In [10],
Elmehdwi et al. proposed a scheme that is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to guarantee privacy of data as well as query. However, this scheme depends
on the existence of a non colluding cloud. This is an assumption not all users are
willing to make. In addition, the communication overhead of this scheme is very
high (proportional to the size of the database).
3 Preliminaries
For an integerm we denote [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. We use JmsgK to denote a ciphertext
that decrypts to the value msg.
The field Zp, where p is prime, is the set {0, . . . , p− 1} equipped with + and
· done modulo p.
We denote by dxc, where x ∈ R, the rounding of x to the nearest integer.
A database of Zdp points of size n is the tuple S = (s1, . . . , sn), where
s1, . . . , sn ∈ Zdp. We denote by class(si) ∈ {0, 1} the class of si.
Let S = (s1, . . . , sn) be a database of Zdp points of size n and let q ∈ Zdp. The
distance distribution is the distribution of the random variable x = dist(si, q),
where i← [n] is drawn uniformly. We denote the distance distribution by DS,q.
The statistical distance between two discrete probability distribution X and
Y over a finite set {0, . . . , p− 1}, denoted SD(X,Y ), is defined as
SD(X,Y ) = max
u∈{0,...,p−1}
|Pr[x = u]− Pr[y = u]| ,
where x ∼ X and y ∼ Y.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a distribution X is defined as
CDFX(α) = Pr[x < α | x ∼ X].
The F1 Score (also called Dice coefficient or Sorensen coefficient) is a measure
of similarity of two sets. It is given by F1 = 2 |X∩Y ||X|+|Y | , where X and Y are sets.
In the context of classifier, the F1 score is used to measure the accuracy of a
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classifier by taking X to be the set of samples classified as 1 and Y be the set of
samples whose class is 1.
3.1 Polynomial Interpolation
For a prime p and a function f : [0, p] 7→ [0, p], we define the polynomial
Pf,p : Zp 7→ Zp, where Pf,p(x) = df(x)c for all x ∈ Zp. When p is known from
the context we simple write Pf .
An explicit description of Pf,p can be given by the interpolation
Pf,p(x) =
p−1∑
i=0
(x− 0) · · · (x− (i− 1)) · (x− (i+ 1)) · · · (x− (p− 1))
(i− 0) · · · (i− (i− 1)) · (i− (i+ 1)) · · · (i− (p− 1)) df(i)c.
Rearranging the above we can write
Pf,p(x) =
p−1∑
i=0
αix
i
for appropriate coefficients α0, . . . , αp−1 that depend on f . In this paper we use
several polynomial interpolations:
– P√·(x) = d
√
xc.
– P(·)2/p(x) = x2/p.
– P(·=0)(x) = 1 if x = 0 and 0 otherwise.
– P(√(·)+p(x) =
√
x+ p.
– P(√(·)p(x) =
√
xp.
– PisNegative(·)(x) = 1 if x > p/2 and 0 otherwise.
Comparing Two Ciphertexts. We also define a two variate function isSmaller :
Zp×Zp 7→ {0, 1}, where isSmaller(x, y) = 1 iff x < y. In this paper we implement
this two-variate function with a uni-variate polynomial isNegative : Zp′ 7→ {0, 1},
where p′ > 2p and isNegative(z) = 1 iff z > p′/2. The connection between these
two polynomials is given by
isSmallerp(x, y) = isNegativep′(x− y).
Computing Distances. Looking ahead, our protocol can work with any implemen-
tation of a distance function. In this paper we analyzed and tested our protocol
with the `1 distance. We implemented a polynomial dist`1(a, b) that evaluates to
‖a− b‖`1 where a = (a1, . . . , ad) and b = (b1, . . . , bd):
dist`1(a, b) =
d∑
1
(
1− 2isSmaller(ai, bi)
)
(ai − bi).
We observe that(
1− 2 · isSmaller(ai, bi)
)
=
{
1 if ai < bi
−1 otherwise.
and therefore
∑
i
(
1− 2 · isSmaller(ai, bi)
)
(ai − bi) =
∑
i |ai − bi| = dist`1(a, b).
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Arithmetic Circuit vs. Polynomials. An arithmetic circuit (AC) is a directed
graph G = (V,E) where for each node v ∈ V we have indegree(v) ∈ {0, 2}, where
indegree(v) is the number of incoming edges of v. We also associate with each
v ∈ V a value, val(v) in the following manner:
If indegree(v) = 0 then we call v an input node and we associate it with a
constant or with an input variable and val(v) is set to that constant or variable.
If indegree(v) = 2 then we call v a gate and associate v with an Add operation
(an add-gate) or Mul operation (a mult-gate).
Denote by v1 and v2 the nodes connected to v through the incoming edges
and set val(v) := val(v1) + val(v2) if v is an add-gate or val(v) := val(v1) · val(v2)
if v is a mult-gate.
Arithmetic circuits and polynomials are closely related but do not have a
one-to-one correspondence. A polynomial can be realized by different circuits. For
example P(x) = (x+ 1)2 can be realized as (x+ 1) · (x+ 1) or by x · x+ 2 · x+ 1.
The first version has one mult-gate and one add-gate (here we take advantage
that x+ 1 needs to be calculated once), while the latter has 2 mult-gates and 2
add-gates.
Looking ahead, we are going to evaluate arithmetic circuits whose gates
are associated with HE operations (see below). We are therefore interested in
bounding two parameters of an arithmetic circuits, C:
– size(C) is the number of mult gates in C. This relates to the number of gates
needed to be evaluated hence directly affecting the running time. (We discuss
below why we consider only mult gates. Mul gates).
– depth(C) is the maximal number of mult gates in a path in C. (We discuss
below why we consider only
Given a function f : [0, p] 7→ [0, p] Paterson et al. showed in [20] that a
polynomial Pf,p(x) can be realized by an arithmetic circuit C where depth(C) =
O(log p) and size(C) = O(√p). Their construction can be extended to realize
multivariate polynomials, however, size of the resulting circuit grows exponentially
with the number of variables. For a n-variate polynomial, such as a polynomial
that evaluates to the k nearest neighbors, their construction has poor performance.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) [3,12] (see also a survey in[14]) is an asymmetric
encryption scheme that also supports + and × operations on ciphertexts. More
specifically, HE scheme is the tuple E = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Add,Mul), where:
– Gen(1λ, p) gets a security parameter λ and an integer p and generates a
public key pk and a secret key sk.
– Encpk(m) takes a message m and outputs a ciphertext JmK.
– Decsk(JmK) gets a ciphertext JmK and outputs a message m′.
Correctness is the standard requirement that m′ = m.
– Addpk(JaK, JbK) gets two ciphertexts JaK, JbK and outputs a ciphertext JcK.
Correctness is the requirement that c = a+ b mod p.
– Mulpk(JaK, JbK) gets two ciphertexts JaK, JbK and outputs a ciphertext c.
Correctness is the requirement that c = a · b mod p.
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Abbreviated syntax. To make our algorithms more intuitive we use J·Kpk to denote
a ciphertext. When pk is clear from the context we use an abbreviated syntax:
– JaK+ JbK is short for Addpk(JaK, JbK).
– JaK · JbK is short for Mulpk(JaK, JbK).
– JaK+ b is short for Addpk(JaK, Encpk(b)).
– JaK · b is short for Mulpk(JaK, Encpk(b)).
Given these operations any polynomial P(x1, . . .) can be realized as an arith-
metic circuit and computed on the ciphertexts Jx1K, . . .. For example, in a client-
server computation the client encrypts its data and sends it to the server to be
processed. The polynomial the server evaluates is dependent on its input and the
result is a ciphertext that is returned to the client. The client then decrypts the
output. The semantic security of homomorphic encryption guaranties the server
does not learn anything on the client’s data. Similarly, the client does not learn
anything on the server except for the output.
The cost of evaluating an arithmetic circuit, C, with HE is
Time = overhead · size(C),
where overhead is the time to evaluate one mult-gate and it varies with the
underlying implementation of the HE scheme. For example, for BGV scheme [3]
we have overhead = overhead(C) = O
((
depth(C)
)3).
Threat Model. The input of the server in our protocol is n points, s1, . . . , sn with
their respective classes. The input of the client is a query point q. The output
of the client is the class of q as calculated by the server based on the classes of
the nearest neighbors of q. The server has no output. We consider adversaries
that are computationally-bounded and semi-honest, i.e. the adversary follows the
protocol but may try to learn additional information. Our security requirement
is that the adversary does not learn any information except what is explicitly
leaked in the protocol. Looking ahead, from the semantic security of the HE
scheme, the view of the Client is exactly its input and its output. In addition the
view of the server is only its input (the server has no output), up to negligible
information that can feasibly be extracted from HE-encrypted messages.
4 Our Contributions
New “HE friendly” classifier. In this paper we introduce a new classifier that
we call the k-ish nearest neighbor classifier and is a variation of the k nearest
neighbors classifier (see Definition 1).
Informally, this classifier considers κ ≈ k neighbors of a given query. This
relaxation allows us to implement this classifier with an arithmetic circuit with
low depth independent of the database size and has significantly better running
times than kNN.
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The success probability of the implementation we give in this paper depends
on SD
(DS,q,N (µ, σ)), where µ = E(DS,q) and σ2 = V ar(DS,q). In future papers
we intend to propose implementations that do not have this dependency.
System and experiments for secure k-ish NN classifier. We imple-
mented our algorithms into a system that uses secure k-ish nearest neighbors
classifier. Our code based on HELib [13] and LiPHE [21] is provided for the
community to reproduce our experiments, to extend our results for real-world
applications, and for practitioners at industry or academy that wish to use these
results for their future papers or products.
A new approximation technique. Our low-depth implementation of the
k-ish NN, is due to a new approximation technique we introduce. We consider the
sum 1/m
∑n
1 f(JxiK), when m and n are integers, f is an increasing invertible
function and Jx1K, . . . , JxnK are ciphertexts. We show how this sum can be
approximated in a polynomial of degree independent of n. Specifically, our
implementation does not require a large ring size to evaluate correctly.
In contrast, previous techniques for computing similar sums (e.g. for computing
average in [19]), either generate large intermediate values or are realized with a
deep arithmetic circuit.
A novel technique for doubly-blinded coin tossing.Our non-deterministic
approximation relies on a new algorithm we call doubly-blinded coin toss. In a
doubly-blinded coin toss the probability of the toss is JxK/m, where JxK is a
ciphertext and n is a parameter. The output of the toss is also ciphertext. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first efficient implementation of a coin
toss where the probability depends on a ciphertext. Since coin tossing is a basic
primitive for many random algorithms, we expect our implementation of coin
tossing to have a large impact on future research in HE.
5 Techniques Overview
We give an overview of our techniques that we used. We first describe the intuition
behind the k-ish NN and then we give a set of reductions from the k-ish NN
classifier to a doubly-blinded coin toss.
Replacing kNN with k-ish NN. Given a database S and a query q, small changes
in k have small impact on the output of the kNN classifier. We therefore define
the k-ish NN, where for a specified k the classifier may consider k/2 < κ < 3k/2.
With this relaxation, our implementation applies non-deterministic algorithms
(see below) to find k-ish nearest neighbors.
Reducing k-ish NN to computing moments. For the distance distribution DS,q, de-
note µ = E(DS,q) and σ2 = V ar(DS,q) and consider the set T = {si |dist(si, q) < T},
where T = µ + Φ−1(k/n)σ and Φ is the CDF of N (0, 1). For the case DS,q =
N (µ, σ) we have |T | = k, otherwise since dist(xi, q) > 0 are from a discrete set
we have
∣∣∣|T | − k∣∣∣ < SD(DS,q,N (µ, σ)) · T · n.
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For distance distribution that are statistically close to Gaussian it remains to
show how µ and σ can be efficiently computed. We remark that µ = 1n
∑
dist(si, q)
and σ =
√
µ2 − 1n
∑(
dist(si, q)
)2, so it remains to show how the first two
moments 1n
∑
dist(si, q) and 1n
∑(
dist(si, q)
)2 can be efficiently computed.
Reducing computing moments to doubly-blinded coin-toss. We show how to
compute 1n
∑
f(xi) for an increasing invertible function f . For an average take
f(xi) = xi and for the second moment take f(xi) = x2i . Observe that 1n
∑
f(xi) =∑ f(xi)
n is approximated by
∑
ai, where
ai =
{
1 With probability f(xi)/n
0 otherwise.
Thus we have reduced the problem to doubly-blinded coin-tossing with prob-
ability f(xi)n (we remind that x1, . . . , xn are given as a ciphertexts).
Reducing a doubly-blinded coin-toss to isSmaller. Given a ciphertext JxiK and
a parameter n, we wish to toss a coin with probability f(xi)n . Uniformly draw
a random value r ← {0, . . . , n}. We observe that Pr[r < f(xi)] = f(xi)/n and
therefore is remains to test whether r < f(xi).
Since coin tossing is a basic primitive for many random algorithms, we expect
our implementation of coin tossing to have a large impact on future research in
HE.
6 Protocol and Algorithms
In this section we describe the k-ish nearest neighbors protocol and the algorithms
it uses. We describe it from top to down, starting with the k-ish nearest neighbors
protocol.
6.1 k-ish Nearest Neighbors
The intuition behind our new classifier is that the classification of kNN does not
change “significantly” when k changes “a little”. See Figure 4 how the accuracy
of kNN changes with k. We therefore relax kNN into k-ish NN, where given a
parameter k the classifier considers κ ≈ k.
Definition 1 (k-ish Nearest Neighbors Classification). Given a database
S = (s1, . . . , sn), a parameter 0 ≤ k ≤ n and a query q. the k-ish Nearest
Neighbors classifier sets the class of q to be the majority of classes of κ of its
nearest neighbors, where f1(k) < κ < f2(k).
In this paper we take k/2 < κ < 3k/2.
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6.2 k-ish Nearest Neighbors Classifier Protocol
We give here a high-level description of our protocol.
The protocol has two parties a client and a server. They share common
parameters: a HE scheme E , the security parameter λ and integers p and d. The
input of the server is a database S = (s1, . . . , sn) with their respective classes
class(1), . . . , class(n), where si ∈ Zdp, and class(i) ∈ {0, 1} is the class of si. The
input of the client is query q ∈ Zdp.
The output of the client is classq ∈ {0, 1}, which in high probability is the
majority class of κ neighbors of q, where k/2 < κ < 3k/2. The server has no
output.
Our solution starts by computing the set of distances xi = dist(si, q). Then it
computes a threshold T := µ∗ + Φ−1(k/n)σ∗, where µ∗ ≈ E(DS,q) and (σ∗)2 ≈
V ar(DS,q) (see below how µ∗ and σ∗ are computed). With high probability
we have k/2 < | {si | xi < T} | < 3k/2. Comparing x1, . . . , xn to T is done in
parallel, which keeps the depth of the circuit low. The result of the comparison
is used to count the number of neighbors having class 0 and class 1.
To compute µ∗ and σ∗ we use the identities µ = 1/n
∑
xi and σ =
√
µ2 − 1/n∑x2i ,
and approximate 1/n
∑
xi and 1/n
∑
x2i with an algorithm we describe in Sec-
tion 6.3.
Reducing ring size. In the naive implementation, we have a lower bound of Ω(p2)
for the ring size. That is because x1, . . . , xn = O(p) and we have the intermediate
values (µ∗)2, µ2 = O(p2). Since the size and depth of polynomial interpolations
we use depend on the ring size we are motivated to keep the ring size small.
To keep the ring size small we use a representation we call digit-couples
representation.
Definition 2 (base-p representation). For p ∈ N and v ∈ {0, . . . , p2 − 1}
base-p representation of v is low(v) = v mod p and high(v) = bv/pc.
We then assign
low(µ∗2) := 1/n
∑
x2i mod p
high(µ∗2) :=
1
np
∑
x2i
where the modulo is done implicitly by arithmetic circuit. Similarly, we assign
low
(
(µ∗)2
)
:= µ∗ · µ∗ mod p,
high
(
(µ∗)2
)
:= µ∗ · µ∗/p,
where the modulo is done implicitly by arithmetic circuit. We then assign
σ∗ =

√
low
(
(µ∗)2
)− low((µ∗2)) if high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) = 0,√
low
(
(µ∗)2
)− low((µ∗2))+ p if high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) = 1,√(
high
(
(µ∗)2
)− high(µ∗2))p otherwise.
Secure k-ish Nearest Neighbors Classifier 11
In Lemma 1 we prove that σ∗ ≈√(µ∗)2 − µ∗2.
We next give a detailed description of our protocol.
Protocol 1: k-ish Nearest Neighbor Classifier Protocol
Shared Input: integers p, d > 1.
Client Input: a point q ∈ Zdp and a security parameter λ.
Server Input: integers k < n, points s1, . . . , sn ∈ Zdp.
a vector class ∈ {0, 1}n, s.t. class(i) is the class of si.
Client Output: classq ∈ {0, 1}, the majority class of κ nearest neighbors of q
where k/2 < κ < 3k/2 with high probability
1 Client performs:
2 Generate keys (sk, pk) := Gen(1λ, p)
3 JqK := Encpk(q)
4 Send (pk, JqK) to the server
5 Server performs:
6 for each i ∈ 1, . . . , n do
7 JxiK := computeDist(JqK, si)
8 Jµ∗K := approximate 1
n
∑JxiK
9
(Jlow(µ∗2)K, Jhigh(µ∗2)K) := digit-couples rep. of 1n∑JxiK2
10
(Jlow((µ∗)2)K, Jhigh((µ∗)2)K) := base-p rep. of (µ∗)2
11 Jσ∗K := approximate √(µ∗)2 − µ∗2
12 JT ∗K := Jµ∗K+ dΦ−1( k
n
)cJσ∗K
13 JC0K :=∑ni=1 isSmaller(JxiK, J(T ∗)K) · (1− class(i))
14 JC1K :=∑ni=1 isSmaller(JxiK, J(T ∗)K) · class(i)
15 JclassqK := isSmaller(JC0K, JC1K)
16 Send JclassqK to the client
17 Client performs:
18 classq := Decsk(JclassqK)
Protocol Code Explained. Protocol 1 follows the high level description given
above. As a first step the client generates a key pair (sk, pk), encrypts q and
sends (pk, JqK) to the Server (Line 2-4).
The server computes the distances, x1, . . . , xn (Line 7), where computeDist(si, q)
computes the distance between si and q.
The server then computes an approximation to the average, µ∗ ≈ 1/n∑xi,
(Line 8) by calling ProbabilisticAverage (Algorithm 2).
12 Hayim Shaul, Dan Feldman, and Daniela Rus
In Line 9 the sever computes the base-p representation of the approximation
of the second moment, µ∗2 = 1/n
∑
x2i .
Jlow(µ∗2)K := approximate 1n∑JxiK2 mod pJhigh(µ∗2)K := approximate 1np∑JxiK2 mod p.
The approximations are done by calling ProbabilisticAverage and setting f(x) =
x2 andm = n andm = np respectively (see Section 6.3 for details on ProbabilisticAverage
parameters). We remind that the modulo operation is performed implicitly by
the HE operations.
Then in Line 10 the server computes the base-p representation of (µ∗)2. It
sets: Jlow((µ∗)2)K := Jµ∗K · Jµ∗K mod pJhigh((µ∗)2)K := P(·)2/p(µ∗)
Next the server computes σ∗ in Line 11 where the square root is done with P√·
and P√(·)+/p. In Line 12 a threshold T ∗ is computed. Since k and n are known
Φ−1(k/n) can be computed without homomorphic operations.
In Line 13 the server counts the number of nearest neighbors that have class
0. This is done by summing isSmaller(JxiK, J(T ∗)K) · (1− class(i)) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Since isSmaller(JxiK, J(T ∗)K) = 1 iff xi < T ∗ and (1−class(i)) = 1 iff class(i) = 0
the sum in Line 13 adds up to the number of neighbors having class 0. Similarly
in Line 14 the server counts the number of neighbors having class 1.
The server compares JC0K and JC1K in Line 15 to get JclassqK the majority
class of the κ nearest neighbors of q. Then it sends classq to the client who can
decrypt it and get the classification of q.
Theorem 1. Let k, p, d ∈ N and S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Zdp, where class(i) is a class
associated with si, also let q ∈ Zdp such that SD
(DS,q,N (µ, σ)) = s, where (µ, σ)
are the average and standard deviation of DS,q. Then:
(i) The client’s output in KNearestNeighbors is classq which is the majority class
of κ nearest neighbors of q in S, where
Pr[|k − κ| > δk] < 2 exp
(
−O
(
δk(σ2 + µ2)
µ+ Φ−1(k/n)σ
))
+2 exp
(
−O
(
µδ2k2σ
µs+ σ2s
))
.
Let KNearestNeighbors denote the arithmetic circuit evaluated by the server
in Protocol 1 and isSmaller and computeDist denote the arithmetic circuits com-
paring ciphertexts and computing the distance between two points, respectively.
(ii) depth(KNearestNeighbors) = O(depth(computeDist)+log p+depth(isSmaller)),
and
(iii) size(KNearestNeighbors) = O
(
n·size(computeDist)+√p+n·size(isSmaller)),
where isSmaller is an arithmetic circuit comparing two ciphertexts, and
computeDist is an arithmetic circuit computing the distance between two vectors.
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The proof of this theorem is given in Section 7.3. In the next subsection we
describe how µ and µ2 are computed efficiently in arithmetic circuit model.
Increasing Success Probability. Since our protocol includes non-deterministic
elements (the doubly-blinded coin-toss), it may fail with some probability. The
success probability can be increased by repeating the protocol multiple times
and taking the majority of replies.
Extension to multiple database owners. Protocol 1 describes a protocol between a
client and a server, however, it can be extended to a protocol where the database
is distributed among multiple data owners. The evaluation of the arithmetic
circuit can then be carried collaborately or by a designated party. In this extension
the parties use multi-key HE (for example [1,17,18]) where a mutual public key
is generated and each data owner encrypt its share of the database. The protocol
continues as in Protocol 1 to compute JclassqK, which can be decrypted by the
client.
Extension to other distributions. Protocol 1 assumes the distribution of the
distance distribution, DS,q, is statistically close to Gaussian. To extend Protocol 1
to another distribution X, the protocol needs to compute the inverse of the
cumulative distribution function, CDF−1X (k/n), for any 0 < k/n < 1. The
probability of failure will then depend on maxCDF ′X(T ), which intuitively
bounds the change in number of nearest neighbors as T changes.
6.3 Algorithm for Computing 1/m
∑n
i=1 f(JdiK)
In this section we show how to efficiently approximate sums of the form 1m
∑n
1 f(JxiK),
where n and m are integers, f is an increasing invertible function and x1, . . . , xn
are ciphertexts.
Algorithm 2: ProbabilisticAverage(Jx1K, . . . , JxnK)
Parameters: Integers, p, n,m > 0, an increasing invertible function f : {0, . . . , p− 1} 7→ [0,m].
Input: x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}.
Output: A number x∗ ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} such that Pr[|χ− x∗| > δ] < 2e−2nδ2 ,
where χ = d1/m∑ f(xi)c mod p.
1 for i ∈ 1, . . . , n do
2 JaiK := toss a doubly-blinded coin with probability f(xi)m
3 Jx∗K :=∑n
i=1JaiK
4 return Jx∗K
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Algorithm Overview. In Line 2 the algorithm tosses n coins with probabilities
f(x1)
m , . . . ,
f(xn)
m . The coins are tossed doubly-blinded, which means the probability
of each coin is a ciphertext, and the output of the toss is also a ciphertext. See
Algorithm 3 to see an implementation of a doubly-blinded coin-toss. The algorithm
then returns the sum of the coin tosses,
∑
ai, as an estimation to 1m
∑
f(xi).
Theorem 2. For any p,m, n ∈ N and f : [0, p] 7→ [0,m] an increasing invertible
function Algorithm 2 describes an arithmetic circuit whose input is n integers
d1, . . . , dn ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} and output is χ∗ such that,
(i) Pr (|χ∗ − χ| > δχ) < 2 exp(−χδ23 ), where χ = 1m
∑
f(x),
(ii) depth(ProbabilisticAverage) = O(depth(isSmaller)),
(iii) size(ProbabilisticAverage) = O(n · size(isSmaller)),
where isSmaller is an arithmetic circuit comparing two ciphertexts.
The proof is technical and follows from Chernoff inequality. The full proof is
given in Section 7.2.
6.4 Doubly Blinded Coin Toss
Algorithm 3: CoinToss(JxK)
Parameters: Two integers p ∈ N, m ∈ R and an increasing invertible function f : [0, p− 1] 7→ [0,m]
Input: A number JxK, s.t. x ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}.
Output: A bit JbK, such that Pr[b = 1] = f(x)/m.
1 Draw r ← [0,m]
2 r′ := df−1(r)e
3 return isSmaller(JxK, r′)
Algorithm Overview. The CoinToss algorithm uniformly draws a random value r
(in plaintext) from [0,m] (Line 1). Since r is not encrypted, and f is increasing
and invertible, it is easy to compute df−1(r)e (Line 2). The algorithm then
returns isSmaller(x, r′) which returns 1 with probability f(x)/m.
CoinToss as an Arithmetic Circuit. Algorithm 3 draws a number r from the
range [0,m] and computes f−1(r), which are operations that are not defined in
an arithmetic circuit. To realize CoinToss as an arithmetic circuit we think of a
family of circuits: CoinTossr for r ∈ [0,m]. An instantiation of CoinToss is then
made by drawing r ← [0,m] and taking CoinTossr.
The proofs of correctness and the size and depth bounds of the arithmetic
circuit implementing Algorithm 3 are given in Section 7.1.
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7 Analysis
In this section we prove the correctness and efficiency of our algorithms. Unlike
the algorithms that were presented top-down, reducing one problem to another
simpler problem, we give the proofs bottom up as analyzing the efficiency of one
algorithm builds upon the efficiency of the simpler algorithm.
7.1 Analyzing Doubly Blinded Coin Toss
In this section we prove the correctness and the bounds of the CoinToss algorithm
given in Section 6.4.
Theorem 3. For p ∈ N, m ∈ R and an increasing invertible function f :
[0, p − 1] 7→ [0,m] Algorithm 3 gets an encrypted input JxK and outputs an
encrypted bit JbK such that
(i) Pr[b = 1] = f(x)/m.
(ii) depth(CoinToss) = O(isSmaller), and
(iii) size(CoinToss) = O(isSmaller), where isSmaller is a circuit that compares a
ciphertext to a plaintext: isSmaller(JxK, y) = 1 if x < y and 0 otherwise.
Proof. Correctness. Since f is increasing and invertible
Pr[f(x) < r] = Pr[x < f−1(r)] = Pr[x < df−1(r)e].
The last equation is true since since x is integer.
Since we pick r uniformly from [0,m] we get Pr[f(x) < r] = f(x)/m.
Depth and Size. After choosing CoinTossr by randomly picking r, that circuit
embeds isSmaller and the bound on the size and depth are immediate.
The isSmaller function may be implemented differently, depending on the
data representation. In this paper, we use a polynomial interpolation to com-
pute isSmaller and therefore, depth(isSmaller) = O(log p) and size(isSmaller) =
O(√p). We summarize it in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. In this paper, CoinToss is implemented with depth(CoinToss) =
O(log p) and size(CoinToss) = O(√p).
7.2 Analysis of ProbabilisticAverage
We now prove the correctness and depth and size bounds of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4. Let p,m ∈ N, x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1} and f : [0, p−1] 7→ [0,m]
be an increasing and invertible function. Denote χ = 1/m
∑n
1 f(xi) mod p then:
(i) ProbabilisticAverage returns x∗ such that Pr[|x∗ − χ| > δχ] < 2 exp(−χδ23 ).
(ii) depth(ProbabilisticAverage) = O(depth(isSmaller)).
(iii) size(ProbabilisticAverage) = O(n · size(isSmaller)).
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Proof. Correctness. We start by proving that ProbabilisticAverage return x∗ such
that Pr[|x∗ − χ| > δχ] < 2 exp(−χδ23 ). From Theorem 3 we have
ai =
{
1 with probability f(xi)m
0 otherwise.
Since ai are independent Bernoulli random variables, it follows that E(
∑
ai) =
1
m
∑
f(xi) = χ and by Chernof we have: Pr (
∑
ai > (1 + δ)χ) < exp(−χδ
2
3 )
and Pr (
∑
ai < (1− δ)χ) < exp(−χδ
2
2 ), from which it immediately follows that
Pr (|∑ ai − χ| > δχ) < 2 exp(−χδ23 ).
Depth and Size. We analyze the depth and size of the arithmetic circuit that
implements ProbabilisticAverage. Since all coin tosses are done in parallel the
multiplicative depth is depth(ProbabilisticAverage) = depth(CoinToss) and the
size is size(ProbabilisticAverage) = O(n · depth(CoinToss)).
7.3 Analysis of KNearestNeighbors
In this subsection we prove the correctness and bounds of the KNearestNeighbors
protocol.
Theorem 1. Let k, p, d ∈ N and S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Zdp, where class(i) is a class
associated with si, also let q ∈ Zdp such that SD
(DS,q,N (µ, σ)) = s, where (µ, σ)
are the average and standard deviation of DS,q. Then:
(i) The client’s output in KNearestNeighbors is classq which is the majority class
of κ nearest neighbors of q in S, where
Pr[|k − κ| > δk] < 2 exp
(
−O
(
δk(σ2 + µ2)
µ+ Φ−1(k/n)σ
))
+2 exp
(
−O
(
µδ2k2σ
µs+ σ2s
))
.
Let KNearestNeighbors denote the arithmetic circuit evaluated by the server
in Protocol 1 and isSmaller and computeDist denote the arithmetic circuits com-
paring ciphertexts and computing the distance between two points, respectively.
(ii) depth(KNearestNeighbors) = O(depth(computeDist)+log p+depth(isSmaller)),
and
(iii) size(KNearestNeighbors) = O
(
n·size(computeDist)+√p+n·size(isSmaller)),
where isSmaller is an arithmetic circuit comparing two ciphertexts, and
computeDist is an arithmetic circuit computing the distance between two vectors.
Proof. Correctness. For lack of space we give the proof of correctness in Ap-
pendix A. In a nutshell, the proof follows these steps:
– Use Theorem 4 to prove µ∗ ≈ µ and µ∗2 ≈ µ2 (with high probability),
where µ and µ2 are the first two moments of DS,q and µ∗ and µ∗2 are the
approximations calculated using ProbabilisticAverage.
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– Prove σ∗ ≈ σ (with high probability), where σ =
√
µ2 − µ2 and σ∗ is the
approximation calculated by KNearestNeighbors.
– Prove T ∗ ≈ T (with high probability), where T = µ + Φ−1(k/n)σ and
T ∗ = µ∗ + Φ−1(k/n)σ∗ as calculated by KNearestNeighbors.
– Prove |{xi |xi < T ∗}| ≈ |{xi |xi < T}| (with high probability), where DS,q
is statistically close to N (µ, σ).
Depth and Size. The protocol consists of 7 steps:
1. Compute distances x1, . . . , xn.
2. Compute µ∗ and µ∗2.
3. Compute (µ∗)2
4. Compute σ∗.
5. Compute T ∗.
6. Compute C0 and C1.
7. Compute classq.
Step 1 is done by instantiating n computeDist sub-circuits in parallel; Step 2 is
done by instantiating O(1) ProbabilisticAverage sub-circuits in parallel; Steps 3-
5 are done by instantiating O(1) polynomials in parallel; Step 6 is done by
instantiating O(n) isSmaller sub-circuits in parallel, and Step 7 is done by
instantiating O(1) polynomials.
Summing it all up we get that
depth(KNearestNeighbors) = O
(
depth(computeDist)+log p+depth(isSmaller)
)
,
and
size(KNearestNeighbors) = O
(
n · size(computeDist) +√p+ n · size(isSmaller)).
Plugging in our implementations of isSmaller and computeDist we get this
corollary.
Corollary 2. Protocol 1 can be implemented with
depth(KNearestNeighbors) = O(log p),
and
size(KNearestNeighbors) = O(n · √p).
8 Security Analysis
The k-ish Nearest Neighbors protocol involves two parties, called client and
server. The client and the server have shared parameters: a security parameter λ,
a HE scheme E working over a ring of size p and the dimension d. In addition
the client has a query given as a vector q ∈ Zdp. The server has additional input:
two integers k < n, a database of vectors S = (s1, . . . , sn), where si ∈ Zdp and
their classifications class ∈ {0, 1}n. the user’s output is the class of q, classq
determined by the majority class of κ ≈ k nearest neighbors. The server has no
output.
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Theorem 5. The secure k-ish NN classifier protocol (Protocol 1) securely realize
the k-ish NN functionality (as defined above) against a semi-honest adversary
controlling the server and against a semi-honest adversary controlling the client,
assuming the underlying encryption E is semantically secure.
Proof. To prove the protocol is secure against a semi-honest adversary we con-
struct a simulator S whose output, when given only the server’s input and output
(1λ, E , p, d, k, n, S, class), is computationally indistinguishable from an adversarial
server’s view in the protocol.
The simulator operates as follows: (i) Generates a dummy query q′; (ii)
Executes the k-ish NN classifier protocol on simulated client’s input q′ (the
simulator plays the roles of both parties); (iii) Outputs the sequence of messages
received by the simulated server in the k-ish NN classifier protocol. The simulator’s
output S(. . .) = S(1λ, E , p, d, k, n, S) is therefore:
S(. . .) = (pk′, Jq′Kpk′ , Jclass′qKpk′),
where pk′ was generated by Gen(1λ, p) and Jq′Kpk′ and Jclass′qKpk′ were generated
by Enc(. . .).
We show that the simulator’s output is computationally indistinguishable
from the view of the server (assuming E is semantically secure). The view of the
server consists of its received messages:
view(A) = (pk, JqKpk, JclassqKpk),
where pk was generated by Gen(1λ, p) and JqKpk and JclassesqKpk were generated
by Enc(. . .).
Observe that the simulator’s output and the server view are identically
distributed, as they are sampled from the same distribution. Furthermore, the
server view is computationally indistinguishable from the real view by the multi-
messages IND-CPA security for the HE scheme E . Put together, we conclude
that the simulator’s output is computationally indistinguishable from the server’s
view S(. . .) ≡c view(A).
9 Experimental Results
We implemented Algorithm 1 in this paper and built a system that securely
classifies breast tumors. We give the details in this section.
Our system has two parties. One party (the server) holds a large database
of breast tumors classified as malignant or benign. The other party (the client)
has a query tumor that it wishes to securely classify using the database at the
server. The client learns only the class of its tumor: benign or malignant. The
server does not learn anything on the query.
We measured the time to compute the classification and the accuracy of
our classifier. In machine learning literature this is sometimes referred to as
performance. We use the term accuracy since we also measure time performance.
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The accuracy is expressed in terms of F1 score which quantifies the overlap
between the malignant tumors and the tumor classified as malignant.
We implemented our system using HElib[13] for HE operations and ran the
server part on a standard server. Since HElib works over an integer ring we
scaled and rounded the data and the query to an integer grid. As shown below,
increasing the size of the grid improved the accuracy of the classifier but also
increased the time it took to compute the classification. As a baseline we show
the accuracy of an insecure kNN classifier working with floating points
9.1 The Data
We tested our classifier with a database of breast tumors [9]. This database
contains 569 tumor samples, out of which 357 were classified as benign and 212
as malignant. Each tumor is characterized by 30 features, where each feature is a
real number. Among others, these features include the diameter of the tumor, the
length of the circumference and the color it showed in an ultra-sound scan. The
full list of parameters can be found in [9]. An insecure kNN classifier was already
suggested to classify new tumors based on this database (see for example [16]).
Although not required by our protocol we applied a preprocessing step to
reduce the dimensionality of the problem. We applied linear discriminant analysis
(LDA) and projected the database onto a 2D plane. This is a preprocessing step
the server can apply on the database in clear-text before answering client queries.
Also, (even when using HE) a 30-dimensional encrypted query can easily be
projected onto a lower dimensional space. The projected database is shown in
Figure 2.
Since HElib encodes integer numbers from a range {0, . . . , p− 1} for some p
that is determined during key generation we scaled the data points and rounded
them onto the two dimensional grid p× p. The choice of p affects the accuracy as
well as the running time of our algorithm. We tested our algorithm with various
grid sizes. As a baseline for accuracy we used a non-secure kNN classifier that
works with standard floating point numbers.
9.2 The Experiment
Accuracy. To test the accuracy of Protocol 1 we used it to classify each point in
the database and computed the F1 score on the set of malignant tumors and the
set of tumors classified as malignant. To test a single point we removed it from
the database and applied our algorithm on the smaller database with a query that
was the removed point. For a database of 568 points we used k = 13 which sets
Φ−1(13/568) ≈ 2. Since KNearestNeighbors is non-deterministic it considered the
classes of the κ nearest neighbors, where with high probability k/2 < κ < 3k/2.
For the classification of each point we ran 5 instances of KNearestNeighbors
and took the majority. We calculated the F1 score by repeating this for each of
the 569 points. We then calculated the F1 score for grids between 20× 20 and
300× 300. The results are summarized in Figure 3.
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Time. The time to complete the KNearestNeighbors protocol comprises of 3
parts:
– Client Time is the time it takes the client to process its steps of the protocol.
In our case, that is (i) generating a key, (ii) encrypting a query and (iii)
decrypting the reply.
– Communication Time is the total time it takes to transmit messages from
between the client and the server.
– Server Time is the time it takes the server to evaluate the arithmetic circuit
of the protocol.
In our experiments, we measured the server time, i.e. the time it took the
server to evaluate the gates of the arithmetic circuit. The time we measured was
the time passed between the receiving of the encrypted query and the sending
of the encrypted class of the query. In some HE schemes the time to evaluate a
single gate in a circuit depends on the depth of the entire circuit. Specifically,
in the scheme we used (see below) the overhead to compute a single gate is
O˜
(
depth(AC)3
)
, where depth(AC) is the depth of the circuit.
We measured how the size of the grid affects the running time. To do that we
fixed the size of the database to 569 points and repeated the measurement for
various grid sizes. The results are summarized in Figure 3 (left).
In addition, we measured how the size of the database affects the running
time. To do that we fixed the grid size and artificially duplicated the points of
the database. In this test we were not concerned if the classification of the query
was correct or not. Since the protocol and the algorithm is oblivious to the value
of the points in the database this is a good estimation to the running time of the
server for other databases as well.
9.3 The System
We implemented the algorithms in this paper in C++. We used HElib library [13]
for an implementation for HE, including its usage of SIMD (Single Instruction
Multiple Data) technique, and the LIPHE library [21]. The source of our system
is open under the MIT license.
The hardware in our tests was a single off-the-shelf server with 16 2.2 GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2630 cores. These cores are common in standard laptops and
servers. The server also had 62GB RAM, although our code used much less than
that.
All the experiments we made use a security key of 80 bits. This settings is
standard and can be easily changed by the client.
9.4 Results and Discussion.
Our results are summarized in Figures 3 and 4.
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k-ish NN vs. kNN. In Figure4 we show how the choice of k changes the accuracy
of kNN. The graph shows the F1 score (y axis) of running kNN on the data with
different values of k (x axis). The graph shows that for 5 ≤ k ≤ 20 the decrease
in F1 score is miniscule, from 0.985 to 0.981. For 20 ≤ k ≤ 375 the F1 score
decreases almost linearly from 0.981 to 0.905. For larger values, 375 < k the F1
score drops rapidly because the kNN classifier considers too many neighbors. In
the extreme case, for k = 568 the classifier considers all data points as neighbors
thus classifying all queries as benign.
The graph supports the relaxation we made to consider the k-ish NN.
Grid Size. The effects of the grid size are shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 3 (right) we show how the accuracy, measured by F1 score, changes
with the grid size. As a baseline, we compared the F1 score of our protocol (shown
in a solid blue line) to the F1 score of a kNN classifier (shown in dashed red
line) also run on data rounded to the same grid size. The F1 score of the kNN
classifier was around 0.98 and did not change much for grids of size 100× 100 to
200× 200. The F1 score of our protocol, on the other hand, increased with grid
size. For grid sizes 250× 250 and finer, our protocol nearly matched the accuracy
of the kNN classifier.
For grids coarser than 250× 250 the performance of our classifier grew with
the grid size. For coarse grids our protocol performed worse. For example, for
a 150 × 150 grid our protocol’s F1 score was 0.5. For grids between 150 × 150
and 250 × 250 the accuracy of our protocol improved. Both the kNN and the
k-ish NN were computed in the same grid size. The reason for the difference
in their accuracy comes from the success probability of ProbabilisticAverage
(Algorithm 2): Pr (|µ∗ − µ| > δµ) < 2exp(−µδ23 .) This probability improves as
the average distance µ grows, which happens when the ring size increases. The
success probability of ProbabilisticAverage then affects the success probability of
KNearestNeighbors (Algorithm 1).
In Figure 3 (right) we show how the server time changed as the grid size
changed. A formula for the server time is Time = O˜
(
size(AC) · (depth(AC)3)),
where AC is the arithmetic circuit the server evaluates. Our analysis shows that
for a grid g × g, we have p = O(g) for fixed d, which means
Time = O˜(log3g√g)
.
In Figure 3 (left) we show how the memory requirements of evaluating the
arithmetic circuit of KNearestNeighbors grows as the grid size grows. The increase
in the memory requirements comes from the polynomial interpolations we used.
Our implementation of realizing those polynomials used O(√g) memory for a
g × g grid.
Database Size. The server time of our protocol changes linearly with, n, the size
of the database, S = (s1, . . . , sn). See Figure 4. This can be easily explained
since the depth of the arithmetic circuit does not depend on n and the number of
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gates needed to compute µ, µ2, C0, C1 and the distances x1, . . . , xn grow linearly
with n.
Scaling Our protocol scales almost linearly with the number of cores since
computing µ, µ2, C0, C1 and the distances x1, . . . , xn are embarrassingly parallel.
Fig. 2. On the right, the 569 points in the database, representing breast tumors samples
classified as benign (green) and malignant (red) after applying LDA and projecting
them onto the plane. On the left, two histograms of distances from two random points
on the plane to the 2D points in the database scaled and rounded to a 100× 100 grid.
Fig. 3. On the left, how the time and RAM needed to compute the k-ish NN grows
as a function of the grid-size to which data was rounded to. The x axis is the number
of grid cells in each dimension (e.g. x = 100 means a 100 × 100 grid). The time (in
minutes) to compute the k-ish NN is shown in the blue graph and it corresponds to the
left vertical axis. The RAM (in Giga Bytes) needed to compute the k-ish NN is shown
in the red graph and it corresponds to the right vertical axis. On the right we show in
blue the F1 score (y-axis) as a function of the grid size. In red we show the F1 score of
a kNN ran on the database in plaintext in floating point arithmetics. The x axis is the
number of grid cells in each dimension, as in the left figure.
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Fig. 4. The left figure shows how the F1 score changes as the value of k changes. The
F1 score was calculated on a database of 569 tumors in plaintext in floating point
arithmetics. We also zoom into the range 10 < x < 40, which we show under the graph.
The right figure shows how the server time (in blue) grows linearly with n, and how
the RAM requirements (in red) do not grow as n grows. The server time correspond to
the left vertical axis and the RAM requirements correspond to the right vertical axis.
9.5 The Naive Implementation
In this subsection we describe the naive kNN implementation and its run-
ning time. For a query q and a database S = (s1, . . . , sn) with their classes
class(1), . . . , class(n) the naive implementation follows these 3 steps:
– Compute distances xi = computeDist(si, q) for i = 1, 2 . . . , n.
– Sort x1, . . . , xn in increasing order xi1 , . . . , xin .
– Take the majority of class(i1), . . . , class(ik).
For the second step (sorting), we considered the work of C˛etin et al. [5,6] who
compared several sorting algorithms running with HE. The fastest algorithm
found by their papers was to compute n polynomials Pi(x1, . . . , xn), such that
Pi(. . .) evaluates to the i-th smallest value. In their papers they gave an explicit
description of Pi(. . .). In our case we consider only the k nearest neighbors and
therefore compute only P1, . . . ,Pk.
The time to evaluate Pi(x1, . . . , xn) was too high for our parameters, n = 569.
With smaller parameters, for example, n = 10 evaluating P1(x1, . . . , x10), . . . ,P5(x1, . . . , x10)
took 18 hours. Extrapolating to n = 569 gives a running times of several weeks,
which we were not able to run.
10 Conclusions
In this paper we present a new classifier which we call k-ish NN which is based on
kNN. In our new classifier we relax the number of neighbors used to determine
the classification of a query to be approximately k. We show that when the
distribution of distances from a query, q, to the points in the database, S, is
statistically close to Gaussian the k-ish NN can be implemented as an arithmetic
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circuit with low depth. Specifically the depth is independent of the database
size. The depth of a circuit has a large impact when it is evaluated with HE
operations. In that case, the low depth of our circuit significantly improves
the time performance. This suggests that our solution is a good candidate to
implement a secure classifier.
We give a protocol that, using the k-ish NN classifier, classifies a query, q,
based on a database S. Our protocol involves two parties. One party (the client)
owns q, while the other party (the server) owns S. Our protocol involves a single
round, in which the client encrypts q, sends it to the server, who evaluates
an arithmetic circuit whose output is the (encrypted) classification of q. The
classification is then sent to the client, who can decrypt it.
The communication complexity of our protocol is proportional to the size of
the input and output of the client and is independent of the size of S, unlike
previous work that are not based on HE and whose communication complexity
depended on the running time which is a function of the size of S. The arithmetic
circuit the server evaluates in our protocol is independent of the size of S, unlike
naive implementations with HE. This makes our protocol the best of both worlds
- having low communication complexity and low running time.
The efficiency of our protocol comes from the relaxation of the number of
neighbors used in the classification of q. Relaxing the number of neighbors we
are able to use a non-deterministic approach to find approximately k neighbors.
In the context of arithmetic circuits that means evaluating a random circuit that
was drawn from a set of circuits. In this context we have shown how to construct
a doubly blinded coin toss where a coin is tossed with probability f(JxK)m withJxK a ciphertext, f an increasing invertible function and m > f(JxK). We used
doubly blinded coin tosses to efficiently approximate sums of the form 1m
∑n
1 f(xi)
without generating large intermediate values. Not using large intermediate values
we were able to evaluate the arithmetic circuit over a small ring, which made our
polynomial interpolations more efficient.
We implemented a client-server system that uses our classifier to classify real
breast tumor data. The system used HELib as a HE implementation and ran
on a standard server. Our experiments showed the F1 score of our classifier was
close to the F1 score of plaintext kNN, while being significantly faster than naive
HE implementations of kNN.
In future work we will use our doubly blinded coin toss construction to
efficiently solve more machine learning and other problems. We believe, that a
non-deterministic approach can be used to efficiently solve other problems as
well, and may be of independent interest to the community. We will also improve
our k-ish NN to correctly find k-ish nearest neighbors when the distribution of
distances is not statistically close to Gaussian.
References
1. G. Asharov, A. Jain, A. López-Alt, E. Tromer, V. Vaikuntanathan, and D. Wichs.
Multiparty computation with low communication, computation and interaction
Secure k-ish Nearest Neighbors Classifier 25
via threshold fhe. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual International Conference on
Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, EUROCRYPT’12, pages
483–501, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2012. Springer-Verlag.
2. D. Beaver. Efficient multiparty protocols using circuit randomization. In J. Feigen-
baum, editor, Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’91, pages 420–432, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 1992. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
3. Z. Brakerski, C. Gentry, and V. Vaikuntanathan. (leveled) fully homomorphic
encryption without bootstrapping. In Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in The-
oretical Computer Science Conference, ITCS ’12, pages 309–325, New York, NY,
USA, 2012. ACM.
4. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Online at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/,
1996.
5. G. S. C˛etin, Y. Doröz, B. Sunar, and E. Savas. Depth optimized efficient homomor-
phic sorting. In Progress in Cryptology - LATINCRYPT 2015 - 4th International
Conference on Cryptology and Information Security in Latin America, Guadalajara,
Mexico, August 23-26, 2015, Proceedings, pages 61–80, 2015.
6. G. S. C˛etin, Y. Doröz, B. Sunar, and E. Savas. Low depth circuits for efficient
homomorphic sorting. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015:274, 2015.
7. X. Cheng, S. Su, Y. Teng, and K. Xiao. Enabling secure and efficient knn query
processing over encrypted spatial data in the cloud. Security and Communication
Networks, 8(17):3205–3218, 2015.
8. T. Cover and P. Hart. Nearest neighbor pattern classification. IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theor., 13(1):21–27, Sept. 2006.
9. D. Dheeru and E. Karra Taniskidou. UCI machine learning repository, 2017.
10. Y. Elmehdwi, B. K. Samanthula, and W. Jiang. Secure k-nearest neighbor query
over encrypted data in outsourced environments. In IEEE 30th International
Conference on Data Engineering, Chicago, ICDE 2014, IL, USA, March 31 - April
4, 2014, pages 664–675, 2014.
11. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Official Journal of the European
Union, L119:1–88, May 2016.
12. C. Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In Proceedings of
the Forty-first Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’09, pages
169–178, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
13. S. Halevi. Helib - an implementation of homomorphic encryption. https://github.
com/shaih/HElib/, 2013.
14. S. Halevi and V. Shoup. Algorithms in helib. In 34rd Annual International
Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2014. Springer Verlag, 2014.
15. H. Hu, J. Xu, C. Ren, and B. Choi. Processing private queries over untrusted
data cloud through privacy homomorphism. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE
27th International Conference on Data Engineering, ICDE ’11, pages 601–612,
Washington, DC, USA, 2011. IEEE Computer Society.
16. Kaggle.com. https://www.kaggle.com/uciml/breast-cancer-wisconsin-data.
17. A. López-Alt, E. Tromer, and V. Vaikuntanathan. Cloud-assisted multiparty
computation from fully homomorphic encryption. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2011:663, 2011.
26 Hayim Shaul, Dan Feldman, and Daniela Rus
18. A. López-Alt, E. Tromer, and V. Vaikuntanathan. On-the-fly multiparty computa-
tion on the cloud via multikey fully homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the
Forty-fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’12, pages
1219–1234, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
19. M. Naehrig, K. Lauter, and V. Vaikuntanathan. Can homomorphic encryption be
practical? In Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security
Workshop, CCSW ’11, pages 113–124, New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
20. M. S. Paterson and L. J. Stockmeyer. On the number of nonscalar multiplications
necessary to evaluate polynomials. SIAM Journal on Computing, 1973.
21. H. Shaul. LiPHE: Library for practical homomorphic encryption., 2017.
22. W. K. Wong, D. W.-l. Cheung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis. Secure knn computation
on encrypted databases. In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM SIGMOD International
Conference on Management of Data, SIGMOD ’09, pages 139–152, New York, NY,
USA, 2009. ACM.
23. X. Xiao, F. Li, and B. Yao. Secure nearest neighbor revisited. In Proceedings of
the 2013 IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE 2013), ICDE
’13, pages 733–744, Washington, DC, USA, 2013. IEEE Computer Society.
24. A. C.-C. Yao. How to generate and exchange secrets. In Proceedings of the 27th
Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, SFCS ’86, pages 162–167,
Washington, DC, USA, 1986. IEEE Computer Society.
25. M. L. Yiu, G. Ghinita, C. S. Jensen, and P. Kalnis. Enabling search services on
outsourced private spatial data. The VLDB Journal, 19(3):363–384, Jun 2010.
26. Y. Zhu, R. Xu, and T. Takagi. Secure k-nn computation on encrypted cloud data
without sharing key with query users. In Proceedings of the 2013 International
Workshop on Security in Cloud Computing, Cloud Computing ’13, pages 55–60,
New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
A Proof of Correctness of KNearestNeighbors
In this section we prove the correctness of Protocol 1. We first prove that
σ∗ ≈ σ with high probability, where σ2 = V ar(DS,q) and σ∗ is the approximation
as computed by Protocol 1. Then we prove that T ∗ ≈ T , where T = µ +
Φ−1(k/n)σ and T ∗ is the approximation as computed by Protocol 1. Finally,
we prove that |{si |dist(si, q) < T ∗}| = κ ≈ k with probability that depends on
SD(DS,q,N (µ, σ)).
Proving σ∗ ≈ σ. Let µ = 1n
∑
xi and µ2 = 1n
∑
x2i be the first two moments
of DS,q, and denote σ2 = V ar(DS,q) = µ2 − µ2. Also denote by µ∗ < p and
µ∗2 < p
2 the approximations of µ and µ2 as computed by Protocol 1 using
ProbabilisticAverage, Denote σ† =
√
(µ∗)2 − µ∗2 and σ∗ be as computed by
Protocol 1 from the digit-couples representation of (µ∗)2 and µ2,
σ∗ =

√(
high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2)
)
p if high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) ≥ 2,√
p+
(
low((µ∗)2)− low(µ∗2)
)
if high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) = 1,√
low((µ∗)2)− low(µ∗2) otherwise.
Then,
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Lemma 1.
σ†
1√
2
≤ σ∗ ≤ σ† 3√
2
Proof. When high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) = 0 or high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) = 1 we have
σ∗ = σ†. When high((µ∗)2)− high(µ∗2) > 2 we get σ† > 2p
1
2 ≤
(σ†)2 − p
(σ†)2 ≤
(σ∗)2
(σ†)2 ≤
(σ†)2 + p
(σ†)2 ≤
3
2
Therefore,
1√
2
σ† ≤ σ∗ ≤ 3√
2
σ†.
We thus proved that σ∗ as computed by Protocol 1 is a good approximation
for σ†. We now prove that σ† is a good approximation for σ with good probability.
Lemma 2. Let µ, µ2, σ and σ† be as above, then for any δ > 0
Pr[
∣∣σ† − σ∣∣ < δσ] < 2e−δO(σ2+ µ4σ2+µ2+µ)
.
Proof. Set δ′ = 2δ+(4δ2−6δ)µ2µ2 , then Pr[µ2 > (1+ δ′)µ2] < exp(−
µ2δ
′2
3 ). Since,
(1 + δ′)µ2 − (1− δ)2µ2 = (1 + 2δ)µ2 − (1 + 2δ)µ2, we have:
Pr
(
(σ†)2 > (1 + 2δ)σ2
)
< exp
(
−µ2δ
′2 + 6µδ2
3
)
= exp
(
−δO
(
σ2 + µ
4
µ2
+ µ
))
.
Similarly, set δ′′ = δ − (δ2 + 3δ)µ2µ2 , then Pr[µ2 < (1− δ′′)µ2] < exp(−
µ2δ
′′2
2 ).
Since, (1− δ′′)µ2 − (1 + δ)2µ2 = (1− δ)µ2 − (1− δ)µ2, we have:
Pr
[
(σ†)2 < (1− δ)σ2] < exp(−2µ2δ′′2 + 3µδ26
)
= exp
(
−δO
(
σ2 + µ
4
µ2
+ µ
))
.
Since
√
1 + 2δ < 1 + δ and
√
1− δ < 1− δ we get that
Pr[
∣∣σ† − σ∣∣ < δσ] < exp(−µ2δ′2 + 6µδ23 ) + exp(−2µ2δ′′2 + 3µδ26 ).
Putting it together with Lemma 1 we get,
Pr[|σ∗ − σ| < δσ] < 2e−δO(σ2+
µ4
σ2+µ2+µ)
.
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Proving T ∗ ≈ T . Denote by T = µ + Φ−1( kn )σ, where Φ is the CDF function
of the standard Gaussian distribution, and Φ−1 is its inverse. By definition,
k = |{si |xi < T}|. Also denote by T ∗ = µ∗ + Φ−1( kn )σ∗, as computed by
Protocol 1. We next show that T ∗ ≈ T with high probability.
Lemma 3.
Pr[|T ∗ − T | > δT ] < 2 exp(−δO(σ2 + µ2)) + 2 exp(−µδ
2
3 ).
Proof. Recall that x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, . . . , p} are the distances xi = dist(si, q) with
µ and σ as above. To simplify our proof we assume without loss of generality
that Φ−1(k/n) > 0. This happens when k > µ. In cases where k < µ we replace
x1, . . . , xn with (p − x1), . . . , (p − xn) and we replace k with n − k. By the
properties of Φ−1 we have Φ−1(n−kn ) = −Φ−1( kn ).
We therefore continue assuming Φ(k/n) > 0.
By definition
T ∗
T
= µ
∗ + Φ−1(k/n)σ∗
µ+ Φ−1(k/n)σ .
Since µ, σ, Φ−1(k/n) ≥ 0
1−δ = (1− δ)µ+ (1− δ)Φ
−1( kn )σ
µ+ Φ−1( kn )σ
<
µ∗ + Φ−1( kn )σ∗
µ+ Φ−1( kn )σ
<
(1 + δ)µ+ (1 + δ)Φ−1( kn )σ
µ+ Φ−1( kn )σ
= 1+δ
and therefore,
Pr[|T ∗ − T | > δT ] < Pr[|µ∗ − µ| > δµ]+Pr[|σ∗ − σ| > δσ] = 2 exp(−δO(σ2µ2))+2 exp(−µδ
2
3 ).
We are now ready to prove the correctness of our protocol.
Proving κ ≈ k.
Theorem 1. Let k, p, d ∈ N and S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Zdp, where class(i) is a class
associated with si, also let q ∈ Zdp such that SD
(DS,q,N (µ, σ)) = s, where (µ, σ)
are the average and standard deviation of DS,q. Then:
(i) The client’s output in KNearestNeighbors is classq which is the majority class
of κ nearest neighbors of q in S, where
Pr[|k − κ| > δk] < 2 exp
(
−O
(
δk(σ2 + µ2)
µ+ Φ−1(k/n)σ
))
+2 exp
(
−O
(
µδ2k2σ
µs+ σ2s
))
.
Let KNearestNeighbors denote the arithmetic circuit evaluated by the server
in Protocol 1 and isSmaller and computeDist denote the arithmetic circuits com-
paring ciphertexts and computing the distance between two points, respectively.
(ii) depth(KNearestNeighbors) = O(depth(computeDist)+log p+depth(isSmaller)),
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and
(iii) size(KNearestNeighbors) = O
(
n·size(computeDist)+√p+n·size(isSmaller)),
where isSmaller is an arithmetic circuit comparing two ciphertexts, and
computeDist is an arithmetic circuit computing the distance between two vectors.
Proof (of item (i)). From the definition of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) we have,
κ− k
n
= CDF (T ∗)− CDF (T ).
Since DS,q is a discrete distribution it follows that
CDF (T ∗)− CDF (T ) =
T∗∑
a=0
Pr[x = a]−
T∑
a=0
Pr[x = a]
Since Pr[|T ∗ − T | > δT ] < 2 exp (− δO(σ2 + µ2))+ 2 exp(−µδ23 ) it follows with
the same probability
T∑
a=T (1−δ)
Pr[x = a] <
∣∣∣∣∣
T∗∑
a=0
Pr[x = a]−
T∑
a=0
Pr[x = a]
∣∣∣∣∣ <
T (1+δ)∑
a=T
Pr[x = a]
From the definition of the statistical distance d = SD
(DS,q,N (µ, σ)) it follows
that for n ∼ N (µ, σ):
T (1+δ)∑
a=T
Pr[x = a] <
T (1+δ)∑
a=T
(Pr[n = a]+d) =
T (1+δ)∑
a=0
Pr[n = a]−
T∑
a=0
Pr[n = a]+dδT
= Φ−1(T (1 + δ)− µ
σ
)− Φ−1(T − µ
σ
) + dδT <
√
2piδT
σ
+ dδT
where the last inequation is true since (Φ−1)′(x) < 1√2pi and therefore Φ
−1(a+
b) < Φ−1(a) + b√2pi .
Similarly,
T∑
a=T (1−δ)
Pr[x = a] <
T∑
a=T (1−δ)
(Pr[n = a]+d) =
T∑
a=0
Pr[n = a]−
T (1−δ)∑
a=0
Pr[n = a]+dδT
= Φ−1(T − µ
σ
)− Φ−1(T (1− δ)− µ
σ
) + dδT <
√
2piδT
σ
+ dδT
where the last inequation is true since (Φ−1)′(x) < 1√2pi and therefore Φ
−1(a+
b) < Φ−1(a) + b√2pi .
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Putting it all together we get that for any δ′ > 0
Pr[|κ− k| > δ′T (d+ 2
√
pi
σ
)] < 2 exp(−δ′O(σ2 + µ2)) + 2 exp(−µ(δ
′)2
3 )
Substituting δ′ = δk
T (d+
√
2pi
σ )
we get
Pr[|κ− k| > δk] < 2 exp
(
−O
( δk
µ+ Φ−1(k/n)σ (σ
2+ µ
4
σ2 + µ2+µ)
))
+2 exp
(
−O
( µδ2k2σ
µs+ σ2s
))
We have therefore shown that κ ≈ k with high probability.
